F1 STRATEGY ANALYSIS · CASE 03 · FRANCE 2021

France 2021: When Did Verstappen’s Second Stop Become the Winning Strategy?

Red Bull surrendered the lead by stopping Max Verstappen for a second time on Lap 32. By the end of Lap 33, he was more than 18 seconds behind Lewis Hamilton, but had a substantial offset in tyre compound and age for the final 20 laps. This study reconstructs the required catch rate and tests the principal alternatives.

Independent analysis using publicly available data. Not affiliated with Formula 1 or any Formula 1 team.

Two-stop strategy
Tyre degradation
Catch-rate analysis
Counterfactual analysis

Strategic context

The first stop won the lead; the second gave it back

Verstappen, Hamilton, Sergio Pérez and Valtteri Bottas began on used medium tyres. Bottas stopped on Lap 17. Verstappen stopped on Lap 18 and undercut Hamilton; Hamilton responded on Lap 19. Verstappen led on hard tyres before Red Bull stopped him again on Lap 32 for another set of used medium tyres. Hamilton kept his hard tyres to the finish; Verstappen regained the lead on Lap 52 and won.

Race startFour leading drivers start on used medium tyres
Lap 17Bottas makes the first stop
Lap 18Verstappen stops and undercuts Hamilton
Lap 19Hamilton responds
Lap 32Verstappen makes his second stop
Lap 52Verstappen regains the lead

Race-position and tyre-stint chart for Verstappen, Hamilton, Pérez and Bottas at the 2021 French Grand Prix, highlighting Verstappen’s Lap 32 second stop. — The opening pit cycle put Verstappen ahead, but the Lap 32 stop traded that track position for a large late-race tyre offset. Select the chart to inspect the full-resolution figure.

The second-stop break-even

Could Verstappen repay the second stop?

The measured pit cycle turned a 2.241-second lead at the end of Lap 31 into an 18.160-second deficit at the end of Lap 33. With 20 laps remaining, Verstappen needed an average gap-closure rate of approximately 0.91 seconds per lap to draw level by the finish.

End of Lap 31: 2.241 s aheadTrack position before the second-stop cycle.
End of Lap 33: 18.160 s behindMeasured deficit after the pit cycle.
Relative pit-cycle swing: 20.401 sIncludes the relative performance around the stop.
Minimum gap-closure rate: ~0.91 s/lapRequired across the 20 remaining laps.

Two-panel chart showing Verstappen’s 18.2-second post-stop deficit, minimum recovery trajectory and lap-by-lap pace gain over Hamilton. — The stop created a demanding but achievable target. Verstappen recovered faster than the minimum break-even trajectory from the start of the chase and regained the race lead on Lap 52. Select the chart to inspect the full-resolution figure.

Tyre-offset pace

How the tyre offset powered the chase

Across the same-lap comparison window from Laps 34–51, Verstappen averaged approximately 0.97 seconds per lap faster than Hamilton. The largest share of that measured advantage arrived in the first four laps; the advantage narrowed later but remained positive.

Observed phase averages

Full chase

Window: Laps 34–51
Mean advantage: ~0.97 s/lap

Early chase

Window: Laps 34–37
Mean advantage: ~2.12 s/lap

Middle chase

Window: Laps 38–44
Mean advantage: ~0.64 s/lap

Late chase

Window: Laps 45–51
Mean advantage: ~0.63 s/lap

Two-panel same-lap pace comparison between Verstappen on medium tyres and Hamilton on hard tyres across Laps 34 to 51, with average advantages for three chase phases. — The early chase accounted for the largest share of the observed gap reduction. The same-lap advantage then narrowed as the chase progressed but remained sufficient to keep closing. Select the chart to inspect the full-resolution figure.

Supporting counterfactual

Could Mercedes have covered the stop?

Applying Verstappen’s observed 20.401-second relative pit-cycle swing symmetrically to Hamilton suggests that an immediate Lap 33 response would have placed Hamilton approximately 2.241 seconds behind Verstappen. Over the remaining 20 laps, Hamilton would then have needed to close roughly 0.112 seconds per lap to draw level by the finish.

Modelled rejoin: Hamilton ~2.241 s behind
Nominal closure threshold: ~0.112 s/lap
Opening-stint same-compound median: Hamilton ~0.080 s/lap faster

One-stop sensitivity

Did Verstappen need the second stop?

At the end of Lap 31, Verstappen led by 2.241 seconds with 22 laps remaining. An average relative pace loss below approximately 0.102 seconds per lap would therefore have left him ahead at the finish under a constant-pace projection.

Race constraint

How much pace could the lead absorb?

Lead after Lap 31: 2.241 seconds
Laps remaining: 22
Break-even pace loss: ~0.102 s/lap

Observed pre-stop evidence

The hard-tyre pace was still competitive

Matched-lap hard-tyre median: ~0.24 s/lap faster
Final five matched laps: ~0.39 s/lap faster

Both comparisons express Verstappen’s pace relative to Hamilton’s before the second stop.

Two-panel sensitivity chart comparing Verstappen and Hamilton’s pre-stop hard-tyre pace and projected one-stop outcomes across different pace assumptions. — When extrapolated as constant-pace assumptions, both pre-stop comparisons fall below the break-even threshold and project a Verstappen win. They do not reveal how his hard tyres would have performed for another 22 laps. Select the chart to inspect the full-resolution figure.

Final assessment

Successful, but not proven to be the only winning route

Red Bull’s second stop was aggressive and ultimately successful. It created a large offset in tyre compound and age. After the stop, Verstappen erased an 18.2-second deficit and regained the lead on Lap 52. The public evidence does not, however, establish that it was the only viable winning strategy. His pre-stop hard-tyre pace suggests the one-stop may also have remained competitive under several tested pace assumptions, but degradation over the unrun laps, tyre temperatures, traffic and defensive racing cannot be reconstructed reliably.

Evidence supports

What the public data establishes

The second stop created a large, measurable offset in tyre compound and age.
Verstappen exceeded the required gap-closure rate.
The early chase accounted for the largest share of the observed gap reduction.
Verstappen completed the recovery and won after the second stop.

Evidence cannot prove

What remains counterfactual

That staying out would certainly have lost the race.
That a hypothetical Hamilton second stop would certainly have failed.
That tyre age alone caused the observed pace difference.
That Verstappen’s hard tyres would have degraded at a particular rate.

Transparency

Methodology and limitations

Data and gap reconstruction

Public FastF1 timing data
End-of-lap timing gaps
FastF1 laps flagged as accurate and run under green-flag conditions

Pace and scenario treatment

Lap 1, pit-in and pit-out laps, deleted laps and extreme timing anomalies excluded from pace summaries
Same-lap comparisons to reduce shared fuel-burn and track-evolution effects
Sensitivity analysis rather than deterministic prediction

Interpretive limits

Verstappen’s hard-tyre performance over the unrun laps cannot be observed directly.
Public data does not fully reveal tyre-set availability.
Traffic and overtaking are not fully modelled.
Car pace, driver execution and tyre condition are intertwined.
Counterfactual pit-cycle costs depend on simplifying assumptions.